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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellees (the "Judds") argue that the court must review the 
decision of the Utah State Tax Commission (the "Commission") under 
a "reasonableness and rationality" standard and take the position 
that the court may not reverse the Commission's Final Decision and 
Order unless the court finds the decision to have been arbitrary 
and capricious. It is appellant's position that the correct 
standard is "correction of error". The issue in dispute is not a 
factual issue, nor is it a mixed issue of fact and law; it is a 
purely legal issue and the Commission's ruling is entitled to no 
deference from this court on review. The facts in this case are 
not in dispute. It is the legal effect of those facts which gives 
rise to the controversy in this matter. 
The Judds also argue that the doctrines of res judicata or 
collateral estoppel are inapplicable in cases determining tax 
liabilities in different years and, therefore, the legal conclusion 
of the Third District Court concerning "separation" of the Judds' 
building lots from the remainder of their agricultural property 
should be given no force or effect. Appellant asserts that it has 
been judicially determined, after a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue, that the Judds' improved building lots, 
although physically adjacent, were "separated" from the remaining 
agricultural property, within the meaning of U.C.A. § 59-5-97 
1 
(Supp. 1975) (now codified at U.C.A. § 59-5-510 (Supp. 1987). No 
evidence was produced which would justify a change in that legal 
conclusion. The Judds and the Commission take the position that no 
factual change need be shown because every tax year is a clean 
slate and prior judicial determinations are irrelevant. 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE LAW 
TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE AND THIS COURT MAY 
GRANT RELIEF UNDER THE CORRECTION-OF-ERROR STANDARD 
In their responsive brief, the Judds acknowledge that agency 
decisions, such as the one on appeal here, which involve pure 
questions of law are entitled to no deference to the agency's 
decision on appeal. Hurley v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Comm. of Utah, 767 P. 2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988). Citing Bennett v. 
Industrial Comm'n. , 726 P. 2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986), this court 
explained: 
"We do not defer to the Commission when 
construing statutory terms or when apply-
ing statutory terms to the facts unless 
the construction of the statutory lan-
guage or the application of the law to 
the facts should be subject to the Com-
mission's expertise gleaned from its 
accumulated practical, first-hand experi-
ence with the subject matter." 
The correction-of-error standard also applies 
when the issue is one of basic legislative 
intent. In Big K Corp. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n.. 689 P. 2d 1349, 1353 (Utah 1984), we 
held that no deference was due agency con-
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struction of "statutory or case law" or of its 
organic statute unless it is clear that the 
agency is in a superior position by virtue of 
expertise to give effect to "the regulatory 
objective to be achieved." [Citation omit-
ted.] 
767 P.2d, at 527. 
Rejecting the appellee7s argument that the applicable standard 
was one of reasonableness, the Hurley court noted: 
The facts here are not in dispute. Nor is 
there dispute about the application of the law 
to the facts. The real dispute is solely, 
what does the law require? . . . That is a 
straightforward issue of statutory construc-
tion. Resolution of the issue would not be 
aided by agency expertise, and no term of art 
is at issue. Indeed, it is the courts that 
have expertise in matters of this nature, not 
an administrative agency. [Citation omitted.] 
Of course, the statute and regulations, once 
properly construed, must be applied to the 
facts of the case, but that does not make the 
issue one of mixed law and fact. There is, in 
short, no reason to accord the Board a zone of 
reasonableness in its construction of the law. 
The Board either read the statute and regula-
tions correctly, or it did not. 
767 P.2d, at 528. 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Judds' building 
lots are physically adjacent to their remaining agricultural 
property. See Brief of Appellee, p. 6, f 7. It is undisputed that 
in 1980 the Judds entered into an agreement to sell a portion of 
their property and received, as partial consideration, 16 building 
lots, improved with curb and gutter, sewer and utility hookups. 
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See Brief of Appellee, p. 5, 5 4. It is undisputed that the Judds7 
property, with the exception of the improved building lots, qualify 
for assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act. See Brief of 
Appellee, p. 8, I 14. 
The issue, then, is whether there has been a "separation" of 
the improved building lots from the remainder of the Judds7 
property, within the meaning of U.C.A. § 59-5-510 (Supp. 1987). 
That issue is a purely a question of law. 
The Commission7s ruling does not specifically address the 
issue, but does acknowledge that "prior decisions" denied the 
Judds7 request for assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act. 
The Commission then erroneously concludes that the principles of 
collateral estoppel do not bar relitigation of the issues which 
were litigated and resolved against the Judds by the Third Judicial 
District Court of the State of Utah, in and for Salt Lake County. 
The authorities upon which the Judds rely are inapposite in 
the present case. Johnson v. Dept. of Employment Sec., 782 P. 2d 
965 (Utah App. 1989), involved a challenge to the sufficiency of 
evidence to support an agency7s factual findings that an employee 
was discharged for "just cause" after testing positive for 
marijuana use and the weight to be given the testimony of expert 
witnesses. Boston First Nat, v. Salt Lake Cty. Bd.. 799 P.2d 1163 
(Utah 1990), centered on a dispute concerning the fair market value 
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and expense ratio of bank property and the only issue on appeal was 
the accuracy of the Tax Commission's factual findings. Id. at 
1165. Cottonwood Hts., etc. v. Bd. of Com'rs., etc.. 593 P.2d 138 
(Utah 1979) and Xanthos v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 
P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984), both involve challenges to local zoning and 
planning decisions. In both cases, the factual findings of the 
agencies were the subject of the controversies. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IS ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS IN THAT IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH PRIOR 
DECISIONS AND THE COMMISSION'S HANDBOOK 
Should the court determine that the correct standard of review 
is not correction-of-error, appellant urges the court to determine 
that the Commission's decision is, in fact, arbitrary and capri-
cious in that it is inconsistent with the Commission's prior 
decisions and the Commission has failed to set forth facts and 
reasons demonstrating a fair and rational basis for the inconsis-
tency, as required by U.C.A. § 63-46b-15(4). 
As noted in appellant's opening brief, the Commission prepared 
and distributed a publication entitled "Assessor's Handbook, The 
Assessment of Agricultural Land Under the Farmland Assessment Act" 
(November 1987) (the "Handbook"). This Handbook was prepared to 
respond to questions of county assessors and establish uniform 
guidelines regarding qualification of property for preferential 
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assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act. The publication is 
prepared in a "question and answer" format. The portion of the 
Handbook which specifically deals with the issue presented in the 
instant case appears on page 16 (R. 255): 
Q Can a portion of agricultural land previ-
ously included under the Act be subdivid-
ed without affecting the qualification of 
the remaining agricultural land? 
A As long as the remaining agricultural 
land complies with FAA standards, it can 
still be taxed under the provisions of 
the act. (NOTE: The portion subdivided 
will become subject to the applicable 
roll-back tax (see section 52-2-506). 
The assessor may require an affidavit of 
eligibility for the remaining acreage. 
Relying on the guidelines established by the Commission and 
upon the Commission's prior legal conclusion (affirmed by the Third 
District Court) that the building lots had been "separated" from 
the Judds' agricultural property when the subdivision plat was 
recorded, appellant denied FAA status to the improved building lots 
owned by the Judds. The Commission's Final Decision and Order 
completely ignores its own Handbook and finds, without explanation, 
that the prior decisions are not controlling. 
The Judds make much of the fact that the improved building 
lots are adjacent to the portion of their property which undis-
putedly qualifies for assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act. 
What the Judds and the Commission ignore, however, is that the 
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property has not changed location since the Third District Court 
determined, as a matter of law, that a "separation" has occurred, 
affirming the prior decision of the Commission. The improved 
building lots are also adjacent to other building lots within the 
Vistawest Subdivision and are, in fact, encompassed within that 
subdivision, according to the official plat recorded in the 
official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
The Commission's failure to adequately justify this departure 
from its prior practice — from the guidelines established by its 
Handbook — is arbitrary and capricious. 
POINT III 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT SHOULD BE GIVEN 
TO THE PRIOR DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION 
AND THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
Relying upon Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen. 333 
U.S. 591 (1948) and Mountain States, etc. v. Salt Lake City, 596 
P. 2d 649 (Utah 1979), the Judds argue that collateral estoppel 
and/or res judicata are inapplicable in cases involving tax 
liabilities incurred in different years. While holding this 
proposition to be generally true, the United States Supreme Court, 
in Sunnen, supra, articulated the exception: 
. . . Income taxes are levied on an annual 
basis. Each year is the origin of a new 
liability and of a separate cause of action. 
Thus if a claim of liability or non-liability 
relating to a particular tax year is liti-
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gated, a judgment on the merits is res judica-
ta as to any subsequent proceeding involving 
the same claim and the same tax year. But if 
the later proceeding is concerned with a 
similar or unlike claim relating to a differ-
ent tax year, the prior judgment acts as a 
collateral estoppel only as to those matters 
in the second proceeding which were actually 
presented and determined in the first suit. 
Collateral estoppel operates, in other words, 
to relieve the government and the taxpayer of 
"redundant litigation of the identical ques-
tion of the statute's application to the 
taxpayer's status." [Citation omitted.] 
But collateral estoppel is a doctrine 
capable of being applied so as to avoid an 
undue disparity in the impact of income tax 
liability. A taxpayer may secure a judicial 
determination of a particular tax matter, a 
matter which may recur without substantial 
variation for some years thereafter. But a 
subsequent modification of the significant 
facts or a change or development in the con-
trolling legal principles may make that deter-
mination obsolete or erroneous, at least for 
future purposes. If such a determination is 
then perpetuated each succeeding year as to 
the taxpayer involved in the original litiga-
tion, he is accorded a tax treatment different 
from that given to other taxpayers of the same 
class. As a result, there are inequalities in 
the administration of the revenue laws, dis-
criminatory distinctions in tax liability, and 
a fertile basis for litigious confusion. 
[Citation omitted.] Such consequences, howev-
er, are neither necessitated nor justified by 
the principle of collateral estoppel. That 
principle is designed to prevent repetitious 
lawsuits over matters which have once been 
decided and which have remained substantially 
static, factually and legally. It is not 
meant to create vested rights in decisions 
that have become obsolete or erroneous with 
time, thereby causing inequities among taxpay-
ers. 
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And so where two cases involve income 
taxes in different years, collateral estoppel 
must be used with its limitations carefully in 
mind so as to avoid injustice. It must be 
confined to situations where the matter raised 
in the second suit is identical in all re-
spects with that decided in the first proceed-
ing and where the controlling facts and appli-
cable legal rules remain unchanged. [Citation 
omitted.] If the legal matters determined in 
the earlier case differ from those raised in 
the second case, collateral estoppel has no 
bearing on the situation. [Citation omitted.] 
And where the situation is vitally altered 
between the time of the first judgment and the 
second, the prior determination is not 
conclusive. . . . 
333 U.S., at 598-600. 
Applying the Sunnen criteria, appellant must establish (1) 
that the issue decided in connection with the Judds' appeal of 
their 1985 assessment is identical to the issue raised here, (2) 
that the controlling facts have not changed, and (3) that the legal 
rules applicable to the situation are unaltered. The record in 
this case establishes each of these elements and the Commission did 
not articulate any basis for disregarding either its prior decision 
or the decision of the Third Judicial District Court. 
In 1985, as now, the improved building lots were adjacent to 
the Judds' agricultural property; there were no physical barriers 
separating the property. In proceedings interpreting those 
circumstances, both the Commission and the court reviewing the 
Commission's prior ruling determined that a "separation" had 
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occurred within the meaning of U.C.A. § 59-5-510 and, as a result 
of that separation, the improved building lots must qualify for 
assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act, standing alone, or 
must make a substantial contribution to the overall farming 
operation, if utilized in connection with other qualifying 
property. Nothing in the law and nothing in the factual situation 
has so altered that these prior determinations may be ignored. 
CONCLUSION 
The Final Decision and Order of the Commission is clearly 
erroneous in its application of the law to the facts of this case. 
The Commission's refusal to give collateral estoppel effect to its 
own prior decision and the decision of the Third District Court is 
clearly erroneous. This court should exercise its authority to 
correct the errors of the Commission and reinstate the determina-
tion of the appellant, denying appellees assessment under the 
Farmland Assessment Act. 
DATED this day of October, 1991. 
DAVID YOCOM 
Sal£__Laj£e County At to rney ^ 
-B^L TtfCWfAS PEfERS ' X 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
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